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Abstract. The number of malware detected has been increasing annu-
ally, and 4.12% of malware reported in 2018 attacked Android phones.
Therefore, preventing attacks by Android malware is critically impor-
tant. Several previous studies have investigated the percentage of apps
that utilize accessibility services and are distributed from Google Play,
that have been reportedly used by Android malware. However, the So-
cial Networking Services (SNSs) that are used to spread malware have
distributed apps not only from Google Play but also from other sources.
Therefore, apps distributed from within and outside of Google Play must
be investigated to capture malware trends. In this study, we collected
apps shared on Twitter in 2018, which is a representative SNS, and cre-
ated a Twitter shared apps dataset. The dataset consists of 32,068 apps
downloaded from the websites of URLs collected on Twitter. We clar-
ified the proportion of apps that contained malware and proportion of
apps utilizing accessibility services. We found that both, the percentage
of malware and percentage of total apps using accessibility services have
been increasing. Notably, the percentages of malware and un-suspicious
apps using accessibility services were quite similar. Therefore, this prob-
lem cannot be solved by automatically blocking all apps that use acces-
sibility services. Hence, specific countermeasures against malware using
accessibility services will be increasingly important for online security in
the future.
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1 Introduction
The number of malware detected has increased annually, with 4.12% of malware
found in 2018 reportedly attacking Android phones [6]. A 2018-19 security report
by AV-TEST found a total of 5,490,000 Android malware attacks in 2018 [6].
Contrarily, WeLiveSecurity has reported that the number of Android malware is
actually decreasing [18]. Either way, the number of Android malware is still large
and this poses a significant problem that warrants investigation and prevention.
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In 2017, Dr. Web has reported accessibility service (AS) utilization as a recent
trend for mobile malware [9]. These services are an Android feature intended for
use by people with disabilities, but they have been reportedly used by Android
malware as well. For example, a malware called Skygofree, which uses AS to
eavesdrop on information on user screens was reported in 2018 [14]. Additionally,
in 2019 a malware called Gustuff reportedly used AS to send money unintended
by users [11]. Clearly, there have been many malware attacks that exploit these
well-intentioned AS.
It is therefore important to investigate the utilization rates of AS by Android
applications (apps). There have been reports on the AS utilization rate, specif-
ically by apps that were distributed by Google Play. In November 2017, it was
announced that any apps that were using AS for purposes other than supporting
users with disabilities would be deleted from Google Play [4]. According to the
AS documentation [3]:
“Although it’s beneficial to add accessibility features in your app, you
should use them only for the purpose of helping users with disabilities
interact with your app.”
Therefore, developers could not use Google Play to distribute apps that use AS,
except those intended to help users with disabilities. However, many apps that
use AS could be distributed by methods other than Google Play, so surveys
targeting only Google Play apps are insufficient to investigate the actual dis-
tribution of such apps. We must, therefore, investigate the distribution of apps
that use AS from all sources to evaluate the overall utilization of AS in malware.
Malware and fake websites have been widely shared on Social Networking
Services (SNSs) [13], where many cybercrimes have also occurred [7]. It is there-
fore important to investigate the true situation around Android apps that use
AS so that malware trends can be accurately characterized.
In this study, we collected URLs obtained from Twitter, which is a represen-
tative SNS, accessed these URLs, and collected the Android apps that could be
downloaded to explore apps distributed from sources other than Google Play. We
created a Twitter shared apps dataset that consists of 32,068 apps downloaded
from the websites of URLs collected on Twitter. We clarified the proportion of
apps that contained malware and proportion of apps utilizing AS.
We used this data to identify the proportion of the total number of shared
apps that used AS. This revealed both the threat level presented by apps shared
on Twitter and the danger of allowing AS for SNS distributed apps.
In summary, our study makes the following contributions:
- We created a dataset that consists of apps downloaded from the websites
of URLs collected on Twitter. As far as we know, there is no dataset that
focuses on apps distributed by URLs via Twitter.
- We analyzed the rate at which Android apps shared on Twitter use AS.
Focusing on these apps, which are distributed from third party app stores or
websites, we identified an accurate summary of apps distributed from these
sources in 2018.
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Fig. 1. Extract of manifest declaring AS use
- We show that the proportion of malware is increasing for apps shared on
Twitter.
- We find increasing AS usage rates for Android apps shared on Twitter.
- We show some countermeasures that mitigate the threats of apps utilizing
AS. We believe that the increasing trend of apps utilizing AS will continue,
thus we should carefully check the apps that require AS and their required
permissions.
2 Accessibility Services Overview
Following the AccessibilityEvents documentation [1]:
Accessibility services should only be used to assist users with disabilities
in using Android devices and apps. They run in the background and
receive callbacks by the system when AccessibilityEvents are fired. Such
events denote some state transition in the user interface, for example,
the focus has changed, a button has been clicked, etc. Such a service can
optionally request the capability for querying the content of the active
window.
Notably, apps that use AS can read string data that is displayed on screens
and operate other apps [2], making them particularly powerful and potentially
dangerous.
For an app to use AS, two things must occur. First, it must be declared in
AndroidManifest.xml, an example of which is shown in Fig.1. Second, the user
must allow AS in the app settings. A sample settings screen for Android users
is shown in Fig.2. When utilizing AS, users must change their settings, as the
AS cannot be engaged unless the user permits it.
Malware have been reported to exploit AS. According to Kaspersky, a mal-
ware named Skygofree used AS to eavesdrop on messages received by chat apps
[14]. Skygofree also hid AS permission requests behind other requests to trick
users [14]. Additionally, Group IB reported a malware called Gustuff that au-
tomatically filled forms using AS, in mobile banking app, and was thus able
to steal money from users [11]. Generally, malware that exploit AS can obtain
sensitive information displayed on user screens such as passwords [10]. Further,
malware can operate Android phones automatically to download other applica-
tions from Google Play and post reviews [15]. Often, attackers trick users into
granting access to AS to take advantage of these capabilities.
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Fig. 2. Sample AS settings screen
3 Investigation of the Ratio of Malicious Apps and their
Accessibility Service Utilization Rates
3.1 Purpose of Investigation
Our purpose herein is to investigate the actual AS usage rates of the distributed
apps. To this end, we investigated apps shared on SNS, specifically Twitter. We
selected Twitter because users can use it anonymously, and a single user can
have multiple accounts, making it particularly vulnerable to criminal misuse.
3.2 Method for Collecting Apps on Twitter
As a result of searching for “apk” as a keyword in the public streaming appli-
cation programming interface (API) [17] of Twitter, we collected the uniform
resource locators (URLs) included in all acquired text. We selected “apk” as a
keyword because “apk” is used as the file extension for Android apps. We ob-
tained the contents from the websites of the URLs collected from Twitter as










Fig. 3. Android app file structure
Table 1. Number of apps













well as the contents from the websites contained in the links included on the
websites. Android apps include files with unique names such as those shown in
Fig.3. Hence, we collected files that met all of the following conditions, which
indicate that the file is indeed an app.
A) It is in ZIP format.
B) It includes class.dex and AndroidManifest.xml.
C) It includes a directory named META-INF
For the identified apps, we used VirusTotal to determine whether each was
suspicious and to obtain a list of “detected” warnings for users from multiple
virus scanners. In this research, one or more “detected” readings determined
that the app was suspicious. The app collection period was 1 year, spanning
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, and 32,068 total apps were analyzed.
The number of apps and different certificates are shown in Table 1. Different
certificates indicate different developers. As Table 1 shows, we have collected
many apps with different certificates to ensure we obtained a wide range of
apps.












































































Fig. 4. Percentage of suspicious apps shared on Twitter
3.3 Investigation Method
The flow for analyzing AS usage rates is shown below:
(1) Extract AndroidManifest.xml from the app using Apktool [5].
(2) Search for the following in AndroidManifest.xml:
android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE
(3) If a character string is found as a result of this search, the app is determined
to use AS. Apps exhibiting technical issues such as Apktool that abnormally
terminated, were excluded from the AS usage rate survey.
This analysis allowed us to collect apps according to their trend of being shared
on Twitter. In addition, analyzing AndroidManifest.xml revealed the percentage
of apps that can use AS. Therefore, the ratios of suspicious apps shared on
Twitter and apps using AS could be clarified.
3.4 Investigation Results
Investigating the ratio of suspicious apps. In Figure 4, the percentage of
suspicious apps identified in each month of 2018 is shown, which exhibits an
overall increasing trend.
We can infer from these results that the proportion of malware in the apps
distributed on Twitter is also increasing. Specifically, the average percentage of
suspicious apps was 49.8%. If we generalize this result, we can conclude that
about half of all SNS-distributed apps are suspicious, and installing them is
dangerous and not recommended.



























































































Fig. 5. Percentage of apps that use AS
Investigating the percentage of apps that use accessibility services.
In Fig. 5, the AS usage rates for apps shared on Twitter are shown. The rate
increased from 3.9% in January 2018 to 14.5% in December 2018, for an overall
3.7 fold increase in 2018. Therefore, we concluded that AS utilization in apps
shared on Twitter was on the rise.
Notably, the 2018 AS usage rate for apps distributed on Google Play was
reported to be 0.37% [8], while it was 9.4% (3,015 / 32,068) for the apps collected
in our study. Thus, the utilization rate found here is quite high. This implies that
the AS utilization rates for apps shared on Twitter is higher than that for apps
on Google Play. We can thus infer that the proportion of apps that use AS
increases for app distribution sources without any AS use restrictions such as
those imposed by Google Play.
Analyzing the ratio of apps that use AS for suspicious activity. Figure
6 shows usage rates, classified by whether they correspond to suspicious apps.
From Fig. 6, we observe almost no difference in the AS usage rate depending on
whether or not an app is suspicious. Therefore, the use of AS cannot on its own be
used to identify an app as malware. In fact, the number of suspicious and benign
apps that use AS were very similar. However, as the ratio of suspicious apps to
all those that use AS was high, about 52.8% (1,591 / 3,015), we can clearly state
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Fig. 6. AS usage rates classified by whether they correspond to suspicious apps
that apps shared on Twitter that require AS should not be installed without
considering the significant risk of malware.
4 Discussion
As described in Section 3.4, the overall prevalence of malware and overall AS
usage rates have been increasing. Thus, the malware risk associated with apps
distributed from third-party stores or developer websites has increased accord-
ingly. These are common sources for apps that use AS, likely because Google
Play prohibits the distribution of apps that use AS with any intention other
than supporting app usage by people with disabilities. Figure 6 clearly indicates
that apps that use AS are not necessarily suspicious. Therefore, all apps that
use AS cannot automatically be blocked. Therefore, specific countermeasures
against malware will become increasingly important for online security in the
future.
We believe these countermeasures may include:
- Checking the app developer
When installing an SNS distributed app, it is important to ensure that the
app developer is trust worthy to avoid unintentionally installing malware.
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Contaminated apps may be repackaged and distributed, so it is imperative
to check with the original developers.
- Allow AS only when needed
Confirm the reason that an app requires AS, before permitting the AS use.
This is expected to reduce AS-exploiting attacks.
- Check permissions required with AS
Users should check the permissions required with AS, as attacks could be
prevented by denying these permissions that may leak information.
5 Related Work
5.1 Identifying AS Vulnerabilities
Kalysch et al. [12] showed that AS could be used to eavesdrop on sensitive user in-
formation. They also surveyed the top 1,100 apps on Google Play and found that
99.25% were vulnerable to this type of exploitation. Furthermore, Fratantonio et
al. [10] showed that by combining AS with SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW, which grants
permissions to display on top of other apps, an attacker could perform tasks
such as clickjacking, keylogger, and password stealing. Additionally, McAfee [15]
introduced Click Farm, which uses AS to send fake reviews from devices in-
fected with malware. Collectively, these studies prove that AS can be abused
and exploited, highlighting the importance of investigating AS usage among real
Android Apps distributed on SNSs. In addition, unsuspicious apps use AS. Thus,
it is important to make clear the differences in the AS usage ratios of suspicious
and unsuspicious apps.
5.2 Survey of AS usage rates
Wenrui et al. [8] investigated apps distributed by Google Play, and Mohammad
et al. [16] reported that 2,815 of these 4,155,414 apps used AS, after investigating
their dataset. While these studies investigated AS usage in apps distributed from
Google Play, they did not address those from other sources, such as SNS, third-
party app stores, and developer websites.
6 Conclusion
We collected URLs from the Twitter streaming API, which is a representative
SNS. We then accessed these URLs and collected the Android apps that could
be downloaded to investigate apps distributed from sources other than Google
Play. We created a data set of the 32,068 apps shared on Twitter in 2018 and
showed that 49.8% of these apps are suspicious. Our results also indicate that
the proportions of suspicious apps and apps that use AS had been increasing.
Installing these apps is dangerous and not recommended. In addition, we showed
some countermeasures. The 2018 AS usage rate for apps distributed on Google
Play was reported to be 0.37% [8], but it was 9.4% for the apps collected in
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our study. This implies that the AS utilization rates for apps shared on Twitter
is higher than that for apps on Google Play. Further, the AS usage rates for
suspicious apps and benign apps are very similar, demonstrating the increasing
importance of malware specific countermeasures in the future of online security.
In future works, malware utilizing AS must be analyzed in detail, and specific
countermeasures should be considered and outlined.
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